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The Need for a Contingent Countercyclical PSE Program
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
Introduction
One of the most significant developments in the field of employment
and training policy to occur in the past decade was the revival of job
creation programs. Virtually dormant as a policy instrument since the
1930s, public service employment (PSE) became a contender in the 1970s for
prominence in the nation's arsenal of policy \'Ieapons to combat unemployment.
The evolution of PSE during this era has been laced with controversy and
criticism. For within the span of a mere ten years, PSE has not only had to
compete with more traditional policy measures for support. It has also been
forced into sharply diverse roles as the result of frequent legislature
changes in its prog!'amatic content and objectives.
Yet with the likely prospect of substantial increases in unemployment
rates as the 1980s begin, PSE as it presently stands has been stripped of any
real potential as a countercyclical policy instrument. Its usefulness as an
effective means of combating general unemployment has been essentially nu1-
1ified by the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) Amendments of
1978. Unless these restrictions are either removed or a new title is added,
it will be impossible for any Administration in the 1980s to utilize PSE as
an effective instrument of fiscal policy.
A Brief Policy Review
During the late 1960s, the need for some form of job creation program was
noted by several congressional con~ittees. PSE was also specifically advocated
2by a number of presidential advisory commissions during that era. But
it was not until 1971 that a specific PSE program was enacted. Then, with
unemployment rates on the rise (in the high 5 percent to low 6 percent range),
Congress initiated and President Nixon signed the Emergency Employment Act (EEA)
of 1971. EEAwas the first straightforward job creation law to be enacted in
the United States since 1935. EEAwas enacted as a pure form of countercyclical
PSE. The jobs created were to be IItransitionalll in nature. It had a genera 1
population focus but with an inordinately strong preference given to serving
veterans.
Subsequently, the EEA program as well as most of the other existing
manpower programs were merged into the Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act (CETA) of 1973 (which became effective on July 1, 1974). CETAcreated a
nationwide system of prime sponsors to administer most of the programs authorized
by its provisions. Under the original CETA of 1973, PSE was authorized under
two titles.
Under Title I, a local prime sponsor was free to choose from a variety
of different human resource services in order to achieve a combination of
programs which seemed most appropriate to the citizens of its area. Among
the fundable array of programs was public service employment. Under Title II,
funds were solely available for PSE purposes but restricted to areas where the un-
employment rate was 6.5 percent or more for three or more consecutive months.
Thus, Title II PSE was e~sentially countercyclical in its intention and it
had a general population focus.
Hardly had CETAbegun before it was amended in late 1974 by the Emergency
Jobs and UnemploymentAssistance Act. Passed in response to further increases
3in the national unemployment rate (averaging in the mid-6 percent range),
the Act added a new Title VI to CETA. This original Title VI was designed
exclusively to be a countercyclical weapon. It was intended to encourage
prime sponsors to hire unemployed persons as quickly as possible and to employ
them in public service jobs. Title VI funding differed substantially from the
Title II funding formula. Under the original Title VI, 50 percent of the dis-
tributed funds were based on the proportion of the nation's unemployed population
in its jurisdiction; 25 percent on the proportion of the area's share of all
unemployed persons in excess of 4.5 percent of the labor forc€; and 25 percent
among those areas of substantial unemployment (i.e., 6.5 percent unemployment
for three consecutive months). Local areas with unemployment in excess of 7
percent were able to hire people who had been unemployed for only 15 days.
The thrust of the public service employment programs authorized under
the Titles II and VI, therefore, was toward geographical areas with high un-
employment rates as officially measured and with high coverage rates of unemploy-
ed workers by unemployment compensation. Emphasis was given to participation
by persons who had both low incomes and who were long term unemployed.
In October 1976, the temporary countercyclical program enacted in 1974
as Title VI was renewed by the Emergency Jobs Program Extension Act of 1976.
It provided for the extension of Title VI and it also called for a major re-
design in program format. To overcome criticisms that the original Title VI
program was simply allowing local governments to substitute federal funds for
local funds in hiring public workers, the new Title VI required program agents
to establish clearly definable "projects." Each "project" had a fixed completion
date of no more than one year. Moreover, the "projects" were supposed to be
4in employment ventures that local governments would not normally be able to fund.
The Act also required that 50% of all vacancies that year be filled by low
income, long term unemployed persons.
As unemployment remained high in 1976, the Carter Administration pressed
for an expansion of the existing PSE programs shortly after it came into office
in 1977. The Administration was successful in its efforts. The Economic
Stimulus Appropriations Act of 1977 was enacted. Almost half of the $20
billion stimulus was earmarked for expansion of the existing public service
employmentprograms during 1977 and 1978. During this time period, the level
of PSE participation increased from about 300,000 to 725,000 persons and the
nation's unemployment rate declined from over 7 percent to less than 6 percent
over the interval.
In 1978, the original lifespan of CETA expired. Thus, Congress was given
the opportunity to terminate, rewrite, or reauthorize all CETAactivities.
.
Ultimately, CETAwas reenacted in October 1978, but with a number of fundamental
changes. The public service employment eligibility provisions were changed
dramatically. A new Title II (D) program became entirely a structural PSE
program. Eligibility was restricted to persons who were receiving welfare
or economically disadvantaged and who were unemployed for 15 weeks or more.
All PSE positions under Title II (D) must be at the entry level and, where
possible are to be combined with training and supportive services. For the
previous
first time \'/ith respect to alljPSE endeavors of the decade, no local salary
supplementation is permitted. Title VI was retained nominally as a form of
countercyclical PSE. But it is actually a highly targeted PSE program to
5help only certain groups of people in areas of high unemployment at any time.
A trigger ~echanism was built into the legislation. Funds are supposedly
to be made available to employ 20 percent of the number of persons in excess
of 4 percent unemployment and 25 percent of the excess above 4 percent when
the unemployment rate is in excess of 7 percent. At least 50 percent of the
funds are to be used to employ persons in "projects" of up to one year duration.
All persons not employed in "projects" but who are in regular PSE positions
can only be employed at entry-level jobs. Title VI~ although billed as counter-
cyclical~ requires that all participants be unemployed for ten out of twelve
weeks prior to application and come from a family whose income is below the
Lower Living Standard or is receiving welfare. Also with respect to both Titles
II (0) and VI~ no person may be employed in any form of PSE job for more than
18 months. Severe restrictions are currently placed on the types of people
and the types of jobs for which PSE funds can be used.
The Rationale for PSE
The factors that explain the drastic conceptual changes in PSE that--
occurred with the 1978 CErA Amendments are complex and somewhat controversial.
The rapid build-up of PSE in 1977-8 greatly over taxed the administrative
capabilities of the young system. It should be recalled that the CErA delivery
system was less than three years old when the PSE build-up occurred. As a
form of institution building~ it will take time before the local expertise is
.
developed to handle the responsibilities of local implementation of national
economic policies. But in this case, no lead time for adequate planning or
staffing was provided. Extreme pressure was exerted on prime sponsors to meet
6their hiring goals as quickly as possible. Threats were made that if these
goals were not met rapidlys the money would be taken away and assigned to
other prime sponsors who could meet such performance requirements. At
the same times the prime sponsors were in the process of implementing an
entirely new and comprehensive youth employment initiative (i.e., the programs
created under the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977).
Furthermore, as indicated earliers the PSE programs themselves went through
a number of variations in both content and program design during the period
just prior to the build-up. Thus, the prime sponsors did not have sufficient
experience with the existing PSE programs to prepare themselves for the strains
and pressures of the rapid expansion. The result could have been predicted.
A number of incidents of mismanagement and inefficiencies occurred in the
implementation of the expanded PSE programs. Where they did occur, they were
often highly publicized. Congress reacted in a very negative way
in 1978 to the entire concept of a countercyclical PSE program. The attributes
of PSE over the alternative forms of fiscal policy were seemingly forgotten
in the Congressional haste to chastise the CETAdelivery system.
The Merits of PSE
It is of little value to discuss any policy proposal in the abstract.
Rather, the merits and demerits of PSE as an instrument of fiscal policy must
be assessed in relation '~o other means of reducing unemployment. To be specific,
the primary policy alternative to PSE is tax cutting. The policy research
that paralleled the evolution of PSE program during the 1970s has convincingly
7demonstrated the relative advantages of PSE over tax cutting as a means of
accompl ;shing their common objective. Among these considerations are that PSE
can achieve a specified level of aggregate demand more quickly than a tax cut
since the latter must wait for consumers to spend their tax savings before
there is any effect; the direct creation of jobs is quicker under PSE than
by tax cuts since the PSE jobs are created at once whereas tax cuts do not
initially create new jobs and will do so only after tax savings are spent and
existing inventories are depleted; PSE jobs can be targeted directly to those
people and regions who need additional jobs whereas tax cuts can trigger
inflationary pressures when consumers spend tax savings on items that are short
in supply or create a demand for jObs for which the unemployed cannot qualify.
The major functional criticism of PSE as an effective job stimulation
device has centered upon charges of job substitution. It was alleged that
local governments merely substituted the funds for PSE workers for their own
funds that would otherwise be used to hire the same people. If true, this
could nullify the effectiveness of PSE as a plausible countercyclical device.
But, this criticism overlooked the fact that even if employment substitution
did occur, the availability of PSE would enable local and state governments to
release those funds to spend on other goods and services which would also
stimulate an increase in aggregate spending. Also, the availability of PSE
workers could preclude or lessen the severity of any counterproductive tax
increases that might be necessary at the local level to maintain a needed
level of public services. It is also conceivable that the availability of PSE
workers could allow some local taxes to be reduced with no loss in public
8services. To further allay the fears of possible substitution, the afore-
mentioned requirement was imposed that a substantial number of PSE workers
now must be assigned to short term projects that are definable and distinct
form other activities sponsored or provided for by local and state governments.
Thus, despite the clear superiority of PSE over tax cuts as an effective
means of combating mounting unemployment, the CETAAmendments of 1978 have
virtually made it impossible for the PSE to be available as a pOlicy tool to
combat a general increase in the level of aggregate unemployment. As a re-
sult, by default, tax cutting is now the only readily available means to
accomplish this end. Tax cuts are always politically popular even though they
are a clearly second-best policy as a means of reducing unemployment in a less
inflationary manner. But as matters now stand, tax cuts may be the only
available means to be taken in the event that the anticipated sharp rise in
the nation's unemployment rate in late-1980 does occur.
As an immediate response to risinq unemployment, an available PSE
program is superior to sole reliance upon subsidized unemployment through-
unemployment compensation. PSE at least offers the assurance of increased
production for its claim upon public expenditures. .
The Steps that Need to be Taken
The nation needs to have a contingency plan that involves a significant
PSE program tha~ can be used as a countercyclical measure to benefit the
general labor force. At present, the PSE programs that exist are essentially
structural in their orientation. The case for a contingenty countercyclical
program does not in any way diminish the need for the existing structural PSE
9programs. Rather, it simply means that there are benefits of having a sepa-
rate countercyclical program available as a standby option if it should be
needed. If the legislation were enacted for such a proposal, the planning
could begin and the administrative shortcomings of past crash build-ups in
PSE could be largely avoided. All of the rules, regulations, guidelines would
be known. All funding formulas could be in place. For virtually the first
time in the history of any employment and training program, sufficient under-
standing and planning for such a program could all be done in advance. Then,
if and only if the need should arise, all that would be necessary would be
for the funding appropriation to occur.
There are two possible ways to implement the proposed program for a
contjngent countercyclical PSEprogram. One is to revise the current restrict-
tions and practices that prevent Title VI from becoming a truly countercyclical
PSE program. The second alternative is to add immediately a new title to CETA
that would authorize such a PSE program to meet the employment needs of the
general labor force during times of high national rates of unemployment.
'-
If the first route is taken, several changes would be required. The
first change would be that Congress would have to fulfill the funding pledges
that are already called for under the existing Title VI of CETA. The trigger
requirement that calls for funds to increase as unemployment rises is already
in place. But the appropriations that are required to meet these authorized
increases in program operations have not been forthcoming. In fact, existing
an arbitrary
budget plans call for / reduction in the scale of PSEoperations. A trigger
mechanism for a policy weapon that is actually unloaded eliminates the effec-
tiveness of the entire concept. This is presently the case. Hence, the trigger
10
concept of Title VI must include an automatic funding process if it is to be
meaning~ul. In addition, the existing legislative limitations on the eligibility
of who can participate; the types of jobs that participants can hold; the
wage rates that participants can receive; and the opportunities for local
government to supplement wages and salaries should be waived automatically
when the national unemployment rate reaches a specified level (e.g., 6.5
percent) for a specified time period (say 3 consecutive months). In this
way, Title VI could serve the general labor force and Title II (D) PSE could
remain reserved for the economically disadvantaged who are also unemployed.
The second alternative would be to add a new title to CETA. It would
authorize a standby countercyclical PSE program that would be similar to that
enacted under the Emergency Jobs and UnemploymentAssistance Act of 1974.
It would be a simple program that would encourage prime sponsors to employ
persons in useful public sector jobs as quickly as possible. It would be
authorized to become operative should the national unemployment rate exceed
a specified level (say 6.5 percent) for a specified number of months (say 3
--
consecutive months). The President then could request immediate funding for'
the creation of a sufficient number of jobs to return the unemployment rate
to the 6.5 percent level. Funding should be sufficient to allow those
hired in the program to remain in subsidized employment for a set period of
time (say 18 months)" regardless of whether the aggregate rate should subsequently
fall back to or below the 6.5 percent level. As under the Act of 1974,
eligibility for participation should vary with the local unemployment rates.
For example, any person unemployed for over 30 days would be immediately
eligible but in those local areas with higher unemployment rates, the period
11
of unemployment could be even less. The program should specify that local
and state governments maintain their previous levels of employment.
But given the lead time to do effective planning as to the specific occupations
for which PSE participants would be employed, it should be possible to avoid
many of the administrative pitfalls that occurred during the 1977 build-up.
Although some federal wage ceiling would have to be set, discretion should be
given to local governments to supplement those ceilings if they see fit.
Under either of the proposed alternatives, the lessons of the past should
be incorporated into the appropriate rules and regulations. Namely, as a
countercyclical program, it should be clearly understood that participants
should not be hired and employed in occupations that provide essential government
services (i.e., police, fire fighters, and sanitation services). Rather, the
jobs that are created should be in occupations that make communities better
places to live and to work but are not absolutely essential to its ability to
operate in a viable manner (e.g.~ conservation, beautification, the arts,
weatherization, housing rehabilitations, care for senior citizens, child:~are,
or educational enrichment).
Conclusion
The nation needs to have an available alternative to tax cuts as a means
of creating jobs should the economy require immediate stimulation. PSE has
proven its usefulness as .both a countercyclical and a counterstructural policy
weapon. But as matters now stand, there is no truly countercyclical PSE
program available for immediate implementation. It is suggested that there
should be.
